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After Simondon Series Preface
Thanks largely to the works of philosophers who are inspired by 
him, most notably Gilles Deleuze and Bernard Stiegler, the name 
Gilbert Simondon is becoming more and more familiar to readers 
outside France. Up to the time of writing this preface, however, 
few of his works have been translated into English. It is almost 
an irony that we call this book series After Simondon, dedicated 
as it is to a thinker who is not yet fully available to his readers. 
However, After Simondon does not mean to overtake Simondon 
by declaring his thought obsolete, but rather to address him as 
our contemporary. Indeed, there are challenging contemporary 
issues that Simondon did not and could not address in his time, 
yet which his thought retains the power to interrogate, problem-
atize, critique and illuminate.
This book series traces the implications as well as the critiques of 
Simondon’s thought. It aims to go one step further than simply 
resituating Simondon as a neglected great twentieth­century phi-
losopher of technology. Simondon was not merely a philosopher 
of technology but rather one whose ambition was nothing less 
than to rewrite the history of philosophy according to the concept 
of individuation and to invent a philosophical thinking that could 
effectively integrate technology into culture. After Simondon thus 
poses the question: What could critical thinking and theory con-
cerning technology and individuation be after Simondon—that is, 
both following Simondon but also going beyond him and trans-
gressing his thought?
We contend that Simondon’s concepts and observations could 
serve as a rich source for the development of new concepts, 
theories and practices for coping with our contemporary con-
dition. This includes a wide range of topics from digital objects 
and techno- and media-ecologies to what might be called 
a ‘technological humanism’; from individuation, inventions 
and imaginations to perceptions; from animals to technical 
systems; and from issues of the automatic and alienation in the 
10 twenty­first century to the process of cyberneticization. We hope 
that this series can act as a continuation of Simondon’s projects, 
and we welcome proposals from scholars who are working on 
such subjects in relation to Simondon’s thought.
    Erich Hörl and Yuk Hui  
    Summer, 2015
Author's Preface to the English Translation
The texts brought together here were first published in French 
in two contributed volumes, edited respectively by Jean­Claude 
Ameisen and Laurent Cherlonneix, and by the late Jean­Marie 
Vaysse.1 Erich Hörl and Yuk Hui had the idea of selecting these 
two texts to inaugurate the series After Simondon, and I thank 
them warmly for this. My aim is to provide the reader with a rigor-
ous presentation of some of Simondon’s key ideas, along with 
some developments that we can today bring to them. 
Indeed, these two texts share a double ambition. On the one 
hand, to analyse the general—and in my view the most pro-
found—logic of what I refer to in my work as Simondon’s “genetic 
encyclopaedism.” And, on the other, to lead beyond Simondon, 
in the direction of that comprehensive but open (because anti­
dogmatic) system on which I am working at the moment, and for 
which the concluding part of the second text establishes some 
strictly architectonic principles. In this respect, I would like to con-
gratulate Barnaby Norman for his work of translation. Philo-
sophical language is, we say in French, “a language in a language 
[une langue dans une langue],” and Barnaby Norman was able to 
convey this philosophical language into the English version. 
1 Jean­Claude Ameisen and Laurent Cherlonneix, eds., Nouvelles représenta-
tions de la vie en biologie et philosophie du vivant [New Representations of Life 
in Biology and the Philosophy of the Living Being] (Brussels: De Boeck, 2013); 
Jean-Marie Vaysse, ed., Technique, monde, individuation: Heidegger, Simondon, 
Deleuze [Technics, Life, Individuation: Heidegger, Simondon, Deleuze] 
(Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2006).
Technology and 
the Question of 
Non-Anthropology
Introduction: Non-Anthropology; or, The 
Conditions of a Dialogue
What are the initial conditions of a dialogue between Simondon 
and Heidegger? If the question arises, it is because the difference 
between these two thinkers at first seems irreducible, to such a 
degree that the dialogue risks, through an absence of common 
ground, becoming a misunderstanding. But common ground 
there is, and it is most apparent with respect to the major theme 
of technology.1 To be precise, it is not a misunderstanding that 
will underwrite the dialogue between Heidegger and Simondon, 
but their mutual demand for a non-”anthropological” thinking of 
technology.
1 Translator’s note: I have translated both Technik (from German) and 
technique (from French) as “technology” for the sake of consistency with the 
existing translations of Heidegger’s essay “The Question Concerning Tech-
nology”; it is also noted that Simondon uses the French word “technologie” 
when he refers to the study of “technique(s).”
48 For Simondon, the word “anthropology” is not to be under-
stood in any of its classical senses but designates, on the one 
hand, an essentialist thinking which cuts human being off from 
the living, and on the other, a thinking that reduces technology 
to its use by human being—to what Simondon refers to as the 
“labor paradigm.” It is Simondon’s critique of this second aspect 
of anthropological thought that we will soon be examining. For 
the moment we emphasize that whereas Simondon’s critique of 
these two aspects of anthropology has led some to suppose that 
he was an anti-humanist, his stance seeks only to rehabilitate 
technology, on the one hand, and philosophy of nature on the 
other, without this being to the detriment of human being. It is 
only really possible to understand Simondon here if we accept 
that he privileges a subversion of classical conceptual oppositions 
and conflicts of views.2 So, in both Du mode d’existence des objets 
techniques [On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects] (which 
was his supplementary thesis for his doctorat d’État) and L’individ-
uation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information [Individ-
uation in the Light of Notions of Form and Information] (which 
was his main thesis), the French philosopher rejects the concep-
tual oppositions of nature/culture and technology/culture. It is 
the presence of a third classical opposition—between nature and 
technology—that betrays the weakness of these two conceptual 
oppositions. It is precisely by subverting this third opposition that 
Simondon will subvert the first two.
2 I dedicated the whole of Chapter II of my book Simondon (Paris: Belles 
Lettres, 2014) to this privileging. Here I will simply recall that Simondon not 
only rejects the alternatives realism/idealism, empiricism/innatism and 
skepticism/dogmatism, which had already been challenged by Kant and his 
successors, but also the oppositions mechanism/vitalism, psychologism/
sociologism and humanism/technicism, against which he directed the bulk 
of his work. I showed that underlying all these theoretical alternatives 
there is the conceptual opposition matter/form, which is hidden in each of 
the theses. It is to this opposition that Simondon, for his part, brings back 
the opposition between the philosophizing subject and his object that had 
already been interrogated by Heidegger. 
49Simondon’s privileging of a subversion of classical oppositions 
was rightly highlighted by Gilles Châtelet in his article “Simon-
don” for the Encyclopaedia Universalis, and with this privileging 
Simondon is closer to the book Pour l’homme [For Man] by his 
phenomenologist friend Mikel Dufrenne than to so-called anti-
humanist thinkers. Indeed, Du mode d’existence des objets tech-
niques criticizes what it calls “an easy humanism,”3 which is not 
humanism in general, but only what one might call “a far too easy 
humanism.” In opposition to this, it is for him a matter of estab-
lishing what I would like to call a “difficult humanism,”4 which is to 
say, a humanism compatible with the critique of the two aspects 
of “anthropology” as defined by Simondon. On the one hand, 
this difficult humanism integrates human reality into physis, and 
on the other technology into culture. These two integrations are 
in fact for Simondon just one, since technology, he says, is itself 
what “expresses” “nature” in its connection with the “subject”: the 
technical object is the extension of life through which that life can 
go beyond itself in a relationship referred to as “transindividual.” 
So, Simondon says, the technical object is nature having become 
a “support” for what extends and overcomes simple life. This, 
briefly stated, is the subversion of the first two classical opposi-
tions by way of the subversion of the third.
Now, for Heidegger, the word “anthropology” once again refers 
to a twofold naivety: on the one hand, anthropology is a thinking 
that reduces the essence of human being to a “present-at-hand 
being” (étant-là-devant / vorhandenes Seiende), when this essence 
is, for Heidegger, “Being-there” (Dasein); on the other hand, 
anthropology is a thinking that reduces technology to its use by 
human being. This second aspect brings us back to what is also 
3 Gilbert Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objets techniques (Paris: Aubier, 
1958), 9.
4 I have developed this theme in two texts: “What New Humanism Today?,” 
trans. Chris Turner, Cultural Politics 6, no. 2 (2010): 237–52; and “L’humanisme 
ne prend sens que comme combat contre un type d’aliénation” (interview 
with Ludovic Duhem), Tête-à-tête, no. 5 (2013): 54–67.
50 rejected by Simondon. So, it is here that a true dialogue is pos-
sible, and the question that we will pose to set this dialogue up 
is, of course, the following: How, in its concepts and its theses, 
should a non-anthropological thinking of technology take shape? 
Now, the common thesis of non-anthropology will not be under-
stood in the same way by the two thinkers, not only with respect 
to the first meaning of the word “anthropology,” but also with 
respect to the second. This is the situation: the first aspect of 
anthropology as defined by Heidegger does not match the first 
aspect of anthropology as defined by Simondon. Saying that 
anthropology reduces the essence of human being to a present-
at-hand being is not the same as saying that anthropology cuts 
human being off from the living. Each of the two thinkers would 
situate the other within anthropology—for Simondon, Heidegger 
is still effecting an essentialist break while, for Heidegger, Simon-
don is still effecting a reduction of the essence of human being 
to present-at-hand being.5 But for Simondon, as for Heidegger, 
the two aspects of the anthropology they set out to challenge 
go together, so the understanding of the second aspect will also 
differ between the two, despite the verbal similarity possible in 
the initial diagnosis. The construction of non-anthropology will 
therefore be different for each of our two thinkers, as much in 
its second as in its first aspect. This is what we must now confirm 
by bringing our analysis to bear upon only the second aspect of 
non-anthropology—the aspect relating to technology—and by 
beginning with an exposition of Simondon’s position.
5 It doesn’t mean that Simondon reduces human being to a thing. What Hei-
degger criticizes as an “objectification” (Ver-gegen-ständlichung) is not what 
in French is called “chosification” (Verdinglichung) but a more general attitude 
of knowledge that one might call “objectivation.” I have authorized the trans-
lator to use the classical English translation, that is to say “objectification,” 
but one must keep in mind these remarks.
51The Non-Anthropological Thinking of Tech-
nology in Simondon
L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information 
considered the individuation—which is to say, in Simondon’s 
work, the genesis—of physical, vital, and psycho­social or “tran-
sindividual” beings. Du mode d’existence des objets techniques con-
siders the individuation of technical beings in that they are also a 
genesis. It is only by way of the latter that it is possible, according 
to Simondon, to bring out the sense of technical objects, and to 
reinstate technics with respect to its participation in culture. This 
is why the first part of the book is titled “Genèse et évolution des 
objets techniques” [“Genesis and Evolution of Technical Objects”]. 
From the start, it is a question of refusing to define the technical 
object starting from a classification into genres and species of 
the individual considered as a given. Here, as in his main thesis, 
“it is better to reverse the problem: it is starting from criteria of 
genesis that it is possible to define the individuality and specific-
ity of the technical object.”6 But it is the labor paradigm which, for 
Simondon, seems to order the traditional classification of tech-
nical objects into genres and species. This labor paradigm, when 
it is considered as a social relationship between a master and a 
slave, is an unconscious paradigm of the hylomorphism against 
which Simondon is fighting in his work, the conscious paradigm of 
which lies, he says, in the technical operation of casting bricks.7 
Indeed, it is the labor paradigm that orders the reduction of 
technical objects to their usage, which in turn defines the genres 
and species whose illusory character is condemned by Simondon:
6 Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objets techniques, 20.
7 See Simondon, L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’informa-
tion (Grenoble: Millon, 2005), Part I, Chapter I; and my commentary in Penser 
l ’individuation: Simondon et la philosophie de la nature (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
2005), Chapter II, 4. This commentary is taken up again in abridged form in 
my book Simondon, 106–110.
52 species are easy to summarily distinguish, for practical 
use, as long as it is accepted that the technical object is to 
be understood with respect to the practical end to which 
it responds; but this is an illusory specificity because no 
structure corresponds to a defined use. The same result 
can be obtained starting from very different operations and 
structures: a steam engine, a petrol engine, a turbine, and 
spring or weight­powered engines are all engines; but the 
spring-powered engine is in fact more closely analogous to 
a bow or a crossbow than to a steam engine; the motor of a 
weight­driven clock is analogous to a winch, while an elec-
tric clock is analogous to a doorbell or buzzer. Use brings 
heterogeneous operations and structures together in the 
same genres and species which take their signification from 
the relationship between this operation and another, that 
of the human being in action. So, what we call by a single 
name—engine, for example—may be multiple at a given 
moment and may vary with time, changing character.8
Here it is the opposition between utilitarian character and opera-
tion that is central. That the classification of technical objects into 
genres and species according to their use derives from the uncon-
scious paradigm of hylomorphism constituted by labor, is appar-
ent in this passage, even if implicitly and allusively, in the notion 
of the subsumption of the object under its use by “the human 
being in action.” Such is the root of what Simondon regards as an 
“anthropological” reduction of technology. The different engines, 
for example, only have “a single name” thanks to this illusory sub-
sumption of operation under use, through which the only thing 
that can truly define a technical object is lost—its genesis:
8 Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objets techniques, 19. [The word “opera-
tion” is here used to translate “fonctionnement,” because of the ambiguity 
of “functioning” and “working”: the first doesn’t make a clear distinction 
between the operation and the function or use, and the second refers to 
work, which Simondon rejects as a blinding paradigm. —Auth. & Trans.]
53The unity of the technical object, its character and specificity, 
are characteristic of the consistency and convergence of its 
genesis. The genesis of the technical object appertains to 
its being. . . . The petrol engine is not just any such engine 
in time and space, but the fact that there is a development, 
a continuity from the first engines to those that we know, 
which are still evolving. In this respect, as in a phylogenetic 
lineage, a definite evolutionary stage contains in itself 
dynamic structures and schemas which underlie an evolu-
tion of forms. The technical being evolves by convergence 
and by self­adaptation; it inwardly coheres according to a 
principle of internal resonance.9
Both the beginning and the end of this passage show how the 
technical object is considered here in terms of the perfecting 
(perfectionnement) of a pre­existing operation describing a 
“lineage.” So the opposition is not between genesis and progress, 
but between progress with respect to operation and progress 
with respect to usage, with the latter conforming to totally 
different criteria than those defining the progress of operation as 
the genesis of the technical object: “for this or that use, an engine 
from 1910 is superior to an engine from 1956.”10 Indeed, true 
technical progress conforms to a principle of “convergence” and 
unification by virtue of which a reciprocal causality is established 
through which each element receives its form:
In a contemporary engine, every important element is so 
bound up with the others through reciprocal exchanges of 
energy that it cannot be other than it is. The form of the 
combustion chamber, the form of the valves and the form of 
the piston belong to the same system in which there are a 
multitude of reciprocal causalities. . . . One could say that the 
contemporary engine is a concrete engine, while the former 
engine is an abstract engine. In the former engine, each 
9 Ibid., 20.
10 Ibid.
54 element takes part at a given moment in the cycle, and then 
it is no longer supposed to act on the other elements.11
This is what Simondon, here taking up the Hegelian notions of the 
abstract and the concrete, calls the process of “concretization” 
of technical objects. But such a reciprocal causality only “has” its 
“truth”—again in Hegelian terms—in the idea of the poly-func-
tionality of elements, which alone allows the process of “concre-
tization” to be defined as a process of “convergence.” Contrary to 
the motives determining the usage of a technical object, however, 
the motives determining its evolution by convergence are not 
strictly speaking anthropological: “if technical objects evolve in 
the direction of a small number of specific types, this is due to an 
internal necessity and does not depend on economic influences 
or practical requirements.”12 But before clarifying how the “non-
anthropological” character of the process of concretization–con-
vergence should be understood, we should note that Simondon, 
if we follow the text, must consider the “bespoke” objects of the 
artisan as “abstract,” in opposition to industrial objects which 
alone are “concrete”: “at the industrial level, the object has 
acquired its coherence, and it is the system of needs that is less 
coherent than the system of the object; needs mold themselves 
to the industrial technical object, which in this way acquires the 
power to fashion a civilization.”13 These last words point to the 
progressive autonomization of the process of concretization­con-
vergence, whose “internal necessity” is asserted by Simondon:
The structural reforms allowing for the specification of the 
technical object constitute what is essential to the becoming 
of that object; even if the sciences make no advance during 
a given period, the progress of the technical object towards 
specificity can continue to take place; indeed, the principle 
of this progress is the way in which the object brings itself 
11 Ibid., 21.
12 Ibid., 23–24.
13 Ibid., 24 (author’s emphasis).
55about and conditions itself in its operation and in the 
reactions of its operation on use; the technical object, issuing 
from an abstract labor organizing sub­ensembles, is the 
scene of a certain number of relations of reciprocal causality. 
It is these relations which mean that, based on certain limits 
in the conditions of utilization, the object discovers obstacles 
within its functioning: it is in incompatibilities produced from 
the progressive saturation of the system of sub-ensembles that 
we find the play of limits whose overcoming is constitutive of 
progress; but it is in its nature that this overcoming can only 
take place through a leap, through a modification of the 
internal distribution of functions, a rearrangement of their 
system; what was an obstacle must become a means of 
realization.14
The end of this passage brings us back to what Simondon calls, 
in a note from the same passage, the “conditions of individ-
uation of a system,” conditions which mean that “the specific 
evolution of technical objects is not completely continuous, nor 
is it completely discontinuous.”15 Because technical progress in 
fact changes the obstacles themselves into solutions, it happens 
by continuous supersaturation and discontinuous individuation, 
with supersaturation being found in incompatibilities balanced 
by “detail refinement” of a structure which they do not reorganize 
but which they end up revealing as problematic, the new individ-
uation being the solution which uses the incompatibilities—
simultaneously balanced and revealed by these adjustments—to 
reorganize the structure itself. 
Now that we have made these remarks, we can come back to 
what I referred to as the “non-anthropological” character of the 
process of concretization–convergence. Simondon distinguished 
between the intention on which the fabrication of a technical 
object is based, which is connected to its operation, and the 
14 Ibid., 27–28 (author’s emphasis). 
15 Ibid., 27.
56 intention on which its use is based. But the fabricating intention 
can only explain the genesis of the technical object on condition 
that this intention is not considered anthropologically, which is 
to say as originating with a meaning­giving subject similar to the 
user. In this sense, Simondon does not oppose the Heideggerian 
thinking of Gestell: neither of these two thoughts is—at least at 
first sight—anthropological, even if Heidegger does not situate 
the non-anthropological thinking of technology within fab-
rication. Connected with this restriction there is, as we shall see, 
a real incompatibility in another sense between these two great 
thinkers of technology, since Simondon would certainly not have 
agreed with the Heideggerian thesis according to which “the 
essence of technology is nothing technological.”16 It is a question 
of knowing whether this thesis, which “ontologizes” technology in 
order to “deanthropologize” it, does not originate in an anthro-
pological blind-spot with respect to fabrication, at least from a 
Simondonian perspective, if the expression “nothing technologi-
cal” closing the Heideggerian formula means “nothing of a human 
operation or means.” We will now undertake an internal critique 
of the Heideggerian thinking of technology, which is to say, a 
critique setting out from the non-anthropological intention of 
this thinking so as to turn this intention against the Heideggerian 
mode of its realization.
The Non-Anthropological Thinking of Tech-
nology in Heidegger: Towards an Internal 
Critique of Gestell
The way in which Heidegger quite rightly challenges the 
anthropological thinking of technology may, if examined from 
Simondon’s point of view, in fact seem still metaphysical, even 
16 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: 
Harper Perennial, 1977), 4. [Translation slightly modified. —Trans.]
57“anthropological” in the profound Simondonian sense of the 
term: for Heidegger, it is still in the name of the essence of human 
being that the essence of technology is said to have “nothing 
technological” in itself, which is to say nothing of a simple human 
operation or simple human means. It is surely not by chance if 
ultimately “the essence of technology cannot be guided into the 
metamorphosis of its fate without the aid of human being.”17 
We recall in this connection the major steps of “The Question 
Concerning Technology.”18 In the same way that Simondon had 
distinguished between technology as operation, on the one 
hand, and the use to which we habitually reduce it on the other, 
Heidegger distinguishes between the “essence of technology” 
and its common representation as a means directed towards an 
end.19 Even if this is “correct,”20 both with respect to the technol-
ogy of the artisan and to modern technology, the anthropological 
conception of technology misses, for Heidegger, the true—and no 
longer simply “correct”—essence of technology. It is an essence 
that, on this occasion, only modern technology leads us to ques-
tion: “it is precisely the latter [modern technology] and it alone 
that is the disturbing thing, that moves us to ask the question 
concerning technology per se.”21
17 Martin Heidegger, “The Turning” in The Question Concerning Technology 
and Other Essays, 39. [NB. The English translation differs in a number of 
ways from the French version. Here I have translated from the French. 
The unaltered English version reads as follows: “the coming to presence 
of technology cannot be led into the change of its destining without the 
cooperation of the coming to presence of man.” —Trans.]
18 For a commentary, see Jacques Taminiaux, “L’essence vraie de la technique,” 
in Cahier de l’Herne: Heidegger, ed. Michel Haar (Paris: Editions de l’Herne, 
1983), 263–84.
19 As I said earlier, Heidegger nevertheless situates fabrication on the side of 
use, and so in an “instrumental and anthropological definition of technol-
ogy” (“The Question Concerning Technology,” 10). We may conclude from this 
that Simondon remains naive, but it is in fact Heidegger who shifts the non­
anthropological nature of the process of concretization in favor of a destinal 
thinking of technology, as we shall see. 
20 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 5.
21 Ibid., 13–14.
58 One must, nevertheless, distinguish between the essence of 
modern technology and the essence of technology: even if one 
leads to the questioning of the other, it cannot be reduced to it, 
and it is precisely for this reason that the questioning it brings 
about is “disturbing.” To start with, the essence of technological 
bringing-forth (pro-duction) is not artificial fabrication but the 
“disclosure” from which bringing-forth proceeds, which is physis 
itself:
It is of the utmost importance that we think the bringing-
forth [la pro-duction, Hervor-bringen] in its full scope and at 
the same time in the sense in which the Greeks thought it. 
. . . Physis also, the arising of something from out of itself, is 
a bringing-forth [une pro-duction], poiēsis. . . . Occasioning 
has to do with the presencing [Anwesen] of that which at any 
given time comes to appearance in bringing­forth. Bringing­
forth [Le pro-duire] brings hither out of concealment forth 
into unconcealment. Bringing-forth [Pro-duire] comes to pass 
only insofar as something concealed comes into unconceal-
ment. . . . Technology is therefore no mere means. Technol-
ogy is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another 
whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up 
to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth [Wahr-heit].22
Let us jump ahead so as to note straight away the difference 
between this technology and modern technology: the essence of 
modern technology is Enframing (Gestell) as a mode of unconceal-
ment, a particular mode which paradoxically obscures unconceal-
ment. That which leads us to question the essence of technology 
is the thing that both reveals and conceals that essence: “the 
unconcealment in accordance with which nature presents itself 
as a calculable complex of the effects of forces can indeed permit 
correct determinations; but precisely through these successes 
the danger can remain that in the midst of all that is correct 
22 Ibid., 11–12. One page later, Heidegger writes: “It is as revealing, and not as 
manufacturing, that technē is a bringing-forth.”
59the true will withdraw.”23 This is still only a temporary formu-
lation of the paradox mentioned above, but already at this stage 
we should ask how it is justified. First of all by the fact that it is 
specific to modern technology that is does not unfold “into a 
bringing-forth [une pro-duction] in the sense of poiēsis. The reveal-
ing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Heraus-
fordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it 
supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.”24And 
secondly by the fact that the mode of unconcealment that is 
Gestell as the essence of modern technology makes technology 
appear as a scientific application, so concealing the fact that it 
makes scientific “exactitude” possible:
Because the essence of modern technology lies in Enframing, 
modern technology must employ exact physical science. 
Through its doing so, the deceptive illusion arises that 
modern technology is applied physical science. This illusion 
can maintain itself only so long as neither the essential 
origin of modern science nor indeed the essence of modern 
technology is adequately found out through questioning.25
To this is added the further illusion whereby man only ever 
encounters himself and his works, while Enframing is not his 
doing but what calls him forth, reducing man himself to a stand-
ing reserve. So, in Enframing (Gestell), “unconcealment” as destiny 
(Geschick) comes about as a danger or peril (Gefahr). But this is 
ultimately due to the fact that in Enframing, as the “essence” of 
modern technology, the retreat of unconcealment carries the 
day, dissociating the truth of Being from itself in its essence—a 
formula whose meaning we will need to clarify:
Where Enframing holds sway, regulating and securing of the 
standing­reserve mark all revealing. They no longer even let 
23 Ibid., 26.
24 Ibid., 14.
25 Ibid., 23.
60 their own fundamental characteristic appear, namely, this 
revealing as such.
Thus the challenging Enframing not only conceals a former 
way of revealing, bringing­forth, but it conceals revealing 
itself and with it That wherein unconcealment, i.e., truth, 
comes to pass.
Enframing blocks the shining-forth and holding-sway of 
truth. The destining that sends into ordering is consequently 
the extreme danger. What is dangerous is not technology. 
There is no demonry of technology, but rather there is the 
mystery of its essence. The essence of technology, as des-
tining of revealing, is the danger.26
But even though it is from itself as essence that the truth of 
Being is dissociated by Enframing, it is Enframing that bears the 
“advent” (Ereignis) of “another beginning” (anderer Anfang), one 
where, by way of the “essence” of technology, the truth of Being 
is no longer an essence: “It is technology itself that makes the 
demand on us to think in another way what is usually under-
stood as ‘essence’ [‘Wesen’ ].”27 This is how Heidegger understands 
his recourse to Hölderlin’s phrase: “But where danger is, grows 
the saving power also.”28 And it is precisely at this point that the 
Heideggerian thinking of technology opens onto another non-
anthropology, which is no doubt truer to itself because it has 
dispatched any “destiny” bound to the “essence of human being”: 
the non-anthropology of Simondon’s thinking of human being 
and technology.
Let us be clear. If the reign of technology is the last epoch in the 
history of Being itself inasmuch as it does not reveal itself except 
in its retreat, it is still the case that this terminal unconcealment 
26 Ibid., 27–28. See also “The Turning”: Heidegger declares that when the 
danger has been brought to light, then, as we shall see, the exit from 
metaphysics also becomes possible.
27 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 30.
28 Ibid., 28.
61of Being marks the accomplishment of metaphysics as the 
objectification and forgetting of Being:
The world changes into object. In this revolutionary objec-
tifying of everything that is, the earth, that which first of all 
must be put at the disposal of representing and setting forth, 
moves into the midst of human positing and analyzing. The 
earth itself can show itself only as the object of assault, an 
assault that, in human willing, establishes itself as uncondi-
tional objectification. Nature appears everywhere—because 
willed from out of the essence of Being—as the object of 
technology.29
The anti-metaphysical character of the thinking of Gestell involves 
understanding this accomplishment of metaphysics in Gestell. 
There is in this accomplishment a fundamental ambiguity—on 
the one hand, Gestell completes the objectification of being and 
the forgetting of Being as it conducts the object (Gegenstand) 
towards a “standing­reserve” (Bestand); but on the other, because 
the ob­ject defines Vorhandenheit, the “standing­reserve” which 
extends it already and necessarily gestures outside Vorhand-
enheit, and is “zuhanden” and revelatory of being­in­the­world, as 
well as being the accomplishment of metaphysics. The fundamen-
tal ambiguity of the “standing­reserve” is evident in this passage: 
“Yet an airliner that stands on the runway is surely an object. 
Certainly. We can represent the machine so. But then it conceals 
itself as to what and how it is. Revealed, it stands on the taxi strip 
only as a standing­reserve, inasmuch as it is ordered to ensure 
the possibility of transportation.”30 The means of transport only 
differs from the object because it is also a reference and not just 
29 Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead,’” in The Question Con-
cerning Technology and Other Essays, 100.
30 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 17. To observe the 
ambiguity of Heidegger”s thinking of the subject­object relation, one need 
only read “Science and Meditation.” Here it is the ambiguity of “reserve” 
(Bestand), simultaneously the accomplishment of metaphysics and the exit 
from the “object” which characterized it.
62 a means in which the essence of technology is radically forgotten. 
In other words, Gestell as the essence of modern technology itself 
reveals here what only Sein und Zeit had previously revealed: the 
irreducibility of being to the Vorhandenheit of the object, which 
is to say the system of reference that is the world as a complex 
of “tools,” and which the “artisanal instrument”31 is incapable of 
revealing because that is what it is. The fact that Heidegger says 
here that the artisanal instrument is “independent,” opposing it in 
this way to the “absolutely dependent”32 modern machine, does 
not invalidate our interpretation, but rather confirms that mod-
ern Gestell produced Sein und Zeit itself: not that Heidegger had 
denied his own thought in the meantime,33 but that the forget-
ting of forgetting that is Gestell bears within itself the thinking of 
Being, inaugurated in Sein und Zeit, as “that which saves,” because 
the modern machine can no longer conceal itself as “reference.”
So, if Enframing, the “essence” of modern technology, is a des-
tining of unconcealment which has become a “danger” in that it 
has withdrawn completely, then this is ultimately because the 
aspect of the withdrawal constitutive of any unconcealment is 
absent, revealing that the truth of Being is not essence, a rev-
elation that is the pure withdrawal constitutive of this absence of 
withdrawal.34 Such is the non-self-identity of the truth of Being 
31 Ibid., 17.
32 Ibid.
33 On this point see the “Letter to Richardson,” in William Richardson, 
Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 4th ed. (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2003).
34 On the “identity crisis” of Being at the end of metaphysics, see Michel Haar’s 
very fine text, “Le tournant de la détresse,” in Cahier de l’Herne: Heidegger, 
335–36. On what we will call the “antinomies” of the thinking of Being, 
see Heidegger’s The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, trans. William 
McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). 
This text, which is without doubt one of Heidegger’s most fundamental, 
prefigures—conceptually and so aporetically rather than poetically—the 
final “tautological thinking.” The return to Anaximander made by Heidegger 
after this course in texts such as “The Anaximander Fragment” (in Early 
Greek Thinking, trans. David F. Krell & Frank A. Capuzzi [New York: Harper & 
63qua non-question, and the Heideggerian thinking of the essence 
of technology—as Gestell bearing Ereignis—is what allows philoso-
phy to take leave of the (non­)question of Being. By which we 
understand that in the end this (non-)question could only come to 
what we will call its self­transcending sense by finally uncovering, 
in the fundamental ambiguity of Gestell bearing Ereignis,35 its own 
metaphysical—anthropological, even—unthought: the deter-
mination of “technology” as something instrumental and human, 
which (ontologically) differs from the “essence of technology.” 
If, on the contrary, Heidegger had made an initial distinction 
between use—of means by human being—and fabrication-oper-
ation—he would not have reduced technology in this way and 
Row, 1975], 13–58) could be interpreted as a falling back of the Heideggerian 
history of Being into a posture that is only non-Hegelian in a Hegelian way, 
and which consists of absorbing the history of Being into the “beginning” 
that was unrecognized by Hegel. Not that I, for my part, do not recognize the 
difference that Heidegger, starting from this Hegelian non­recognition of the 
“beginning,” means to indicate between himself and Hegel “with respect to 
the intention of thought, with respect to the law and character of a dialogue 
with the history of thought”—which is the difference between the Aufhebung 
and the “step back” (see Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh 
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969], 49). “Thinking recedes before 
its matter, Being, and thus brings what is thought into a confrontation in 
which we behold the whole of this history—behold it with respect to what 
constitutes the source of this entire thinking, because it alone establishes 
and prepares for this thinking the area of its abode. In contrast to Hegel, this 
is not a traditional problem, already posed, but what has always remained 
unasked throughout this history of thinking.” (Ibid., 50) However, apart 
from the fact that we have here a reading of Hegel which Heidegger himself 
would, in other texts, authorize us to challenge, it is not certain that it is pos-
sible to escape Hegel as long as you lay claim to the “source” of the history of 
thinking. In order to examine this point, I could refer to a polemical revival of 
the French interpretation of Heidegger, precisely as concerns his problem-
atic relationship with Hegel. In writing this I am thinking in particular of the 
work of Christian Ferrié and François Raffoul.
35 More precisely, “What we experience in the Enframing as the constellation of 
Being and man through the modern world of technology is a prelude to what 
is called the event of appropriation [Er-eignis]” (Identity and Difference, 36, 
author’s emphasis). [Translation slightly modified. —Trans.]
64 would not have relied on the ontological difference to save the 
essence of technology from this supposedly ontic sphere.
From Possible Dialogue to Inevitable Mis-
understanding: The Self-Transcendence of 
Heidegger’s Questioning and Simondon’s 
Unthought
This internal critique of Heidegger’s thinking of technology should 
not lead us to think that Simondon has brought the matter to a 
conclusion. If it is true that one may discern an auto-transcendent 
meaning in Heidegger's thought, as I have been able to elsewhere 
with respect to Husserl,36 then the metaphysical and anthropo-
logical unthought in Heidegger’s thinking is only the other side of 
a questioning to come, borne already by this thought and whose 
depths exceed Simondon’s ontogenetic problematic. This is what I 
must now elucidate. It is my conviction that the two problematics, 
Simondon’s and the one whose simple possibility is indicated in 
Heidegger’s thinking, can be articulated on the basis of the inter-
nal critique of Heidegger’s thinking as it presents itself—and not 
as it would like to present itself: that is, as radically non­objectiv-
izing.37 Just like the question of non-anthropology, the question of 
non­objectification is in fact a question that brings Heidegger and 
Simondon together. But it makes the first into the precursor of a 
radically non­objectivizing problematic for which Simondonian 
ontology furnishes a secondary translation—secondary because 
less profound, even if appropriate. In order to understand this, I 
am going to start from an unresolved paradox from the preceding 
discussion. Here is the paradox: it has emerged that Heidegger’s 
36 See my article, “Husserl et l ’auto­transcendance du sens,” Revue philoso-
phique de la France et de l’étranger, no. 2 (2004). On the concept of the auto­
transcendence of sense, see also my book Penser l’individuation, Introduc-
tion, 2. 
37 Here I use “objectivizing” rather than “objectifying” in order to express my 
own thought. On the English translation of Heidegger on this score, see n. 5.
65thinking of technology is in a sense more anthropological than 
Simondon’s, and yet it is also in a sense more destinal—destiny 
not being understood here as that imposed on human being 
by technology, but as that imposed on human being by his 
own essence. Now, this destinal thinking is only really what it is 
because, we remarked above, the essence of human being is no 
longer understood as an essence in which human being would 
belong to himself—from which arises the concept of “Being-
there” (Dasein). But to say that the essence is no longer strictly 
speaking essence, is to prepare the exit from this anthropology 
which until this point had been paradoxically reconciled with 
destinal thinking. Conversely, Simondon’s non­anthropology has 
also ultimately emerged as relatively destinal: technics comes to 
shape a civilization through a process of “concretization” which 
makes it auto­conditioning. There is no paradox here but, on the 
contrary, a very logical association between non­anthropology 
(assumed this time) and destinal thinking. Now, Heideggerian 
destiny differs from Simondonian destiny because for Heidegger 
it is ultimately neither technology nor human being that is des-
tined, but Being. And yet the fact that the question of Being 
proves to be a non­question does not in any sense indicate that 
there could not be a question more radical than Simondon’s 
ontogenetic question—a more radical question which, if based 
on an internal critique of Heideggerian thought, may well lead 
this time, in a second instance, to Simondon’s ontogenetic and 
non­anthropological thinking, as though to both validate it and 
put it into perspective, all the while liberating it from the destinal 
character that burdens it. It is this point that I would like to clarify 
in conclusion.
Even if the internal critique of the Heideggerian thinking of Ges-
tell seems to vindicate Simondon while rebuking Heidegger for 
staying within an anthropological thinking of technology, there 
nevertheless remains what we highlighted right at the begin-
ning: in Heidegger’s view, Simondon would, for his part, adhere 
to an anthropological reduction of the essence of human being 
66 to a being-present-at-hand. Not that this rebuke can stand as 
it is, since it is made in the name of an essence of human being 
which is now problematic. But the accusation of a reduction to 
being­present­at­hand is doubtless valid beyond the debate over 
the essence of human being: the reduction to being-present-at-
hand is not characterized as a particular thesis that Heidegger 
would decry, but as a general attitude of the philosophizing 
individual himself.38 Now, Simondon’s ontogenetic problematic 
may well remain in keeping with this attitude, to the extent that 
what Heideggerian “ontological difference” names is the exit 
from this kind of attitude by way of a double phenomenological 
reduction leading—beyond Husserl’s still egological inten-
tionality—to being­in­the­world; while Simondon, for his part, 
makes no reduction—except, maybe, a Bergsonian “reduction 
to becoming.”39 To emphasize: speaking of a “double reduction” 
with respect to Heidegger does not mean that he remains within 
the phenomenological sphere as defined by Husserl, but that the 
thinking of being-in-the-world may be understood as a “reduc-
tion” which comes to limit the pretentions of the first reduction 
while benefitting from the “step back” inherent in what it thus 
limits: “fundamental” ontology is the heir to phenomenology in 
its distinction from ontology. It is this distancing that Simondon’s 
properly ontological, even cosmological, approach, which derives 
more from Bergson, does not possess.
Of course, genetic ontology or “ontogenesis,” is characterized, 
as Simondon says, by a certain “ontological difference,” which 
in addition indicates once more a way out of the objectification 
of being. At issue is the difference between the individual and 
pre­individual reality—the latter, incidentally, referred to by 
38 On the limits of this archi­reflexive questioning in Heidegger, see my article 
“Hegel et l ’impensé de Heidegger,” Kairos, no. 27 (2006): 89–110.
39 The expression is taken from Merleau­Ponty’s “Bergson se faisant,” Bulletin 
de la Société française de philosophie, no. 1 (1960): 35–45.
67Simondon as “Being qua Being”.40 In any case, Simondon’s concep-
tual configuration is neither clear nor radical and self­sufficient. 
Firstly, it is not clear because individuation, which is the non-ob-
ject, is both the same as and different to the pre­individual as 
it differs from the individual. And it is not radical and self­suffi-
cient, but based on what Simondon calls “schemas of physical 
thinking.”41 In fact, and more profoundly still, the way in which 
Simondon anchors his approach in Bergsonian and Bachelardian 
themes indicates that he misses the primacy of the anti-foun-
dational and radical question of sense. It is certainly possible to 
say that Simondon develops the genetic and anti­substantialist 
ontology that is the counterpart to Bachelardian epistemology.42 
But it is precisely because of this that he prevents himself from 
giving his questioning of the subject­object relationship the nec-
essary depth and reflexivity that would allow it to catch sight of 
the paradoxical constitution of the subject by the object under-
stood as sense—a paradoxical constitution that in fact only 
a double reduction reversing “natural” or naive intentionality 
allows us to glimpse.
Even if the Heideggerian question of Being cannot be completely 
identified with this question of sense either, it leads to it, at least 
40 Simondon, L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information, 
317. In the Introduction of the same book, Simondon uses the expression 
“Being as it is,” which indicates that what he calls “Being” (Sein / être) would 
be a being (Seiende / étant) from Heidegger’s point of view: in Heidegger, 
Being isn’t, but “there is” Being (es gibt Sein / il y a l’être).
41 Ibid., 327–28. The “biological” or “technical” (ibid.) schemas of thinking are in 
fact based on these physical schemas, in Simondon, thanks to contemporary 
physics, which broadens physical rationality. That is why the conclusion of 
the book only develops the question of the physical schemas. 
42 On this point see my book Simondon ou l’encyclopédisme génétique (Paris: 
PUF, 2008), 9–13, as well as my article “D’une rencontre fertile de Bergson et 
Bachelard: l ’ontologie génétique de Simondon,” in Bergson et Bachelard: Con-
tinuité et discontinuité, ed. Frédéric Worms and Jean-Jacques Wunenburger 
(Paris: PUF, 2008), 223–38. On Bachelard’s constancy, pertinence, as well as 
his limits regarding his relation to Husserlian phenomenology, see Bernard 
Barsotti’s Bachelard critique de Husserl (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2003). 
68 potentially, precisely at the high point of the interrogation of 
non­objectivity through the thematics of “worldhood” and “mean-
ingfulness” (Bedeutsamkeit). In fact, it is in §§ 12–18 of Sein und Zeit 
that, in the first place, being­in­the­world proves to be irreducible 
to an object of knowledge, knowledge being rather only a mode 
of being­in­the­world. At the same time it is revealed that praxis 
is still inherent in theoria, the latter being a mode or dimension 
of a praxis which, when “ontologized” in a non­materialist way—
such are the commonalities and the difference between Marx 
and Heidegger—is equivalent to being­in­the­world because it 
is multi-modal or multi-dimensional. Indeed, there is a kind of 
multi-dimensionality to being-in-the-world, a multi-dimensional-
ity whose establishment the thematic of “meaningfulness” would 
have permitted had Heidegger not made it into a simple system 
of “reference” instead of multi­dimensionally diffracting every 
signification—here understood as representation (“tree,” “table,” 
“concept,” etc.). But, multi­dimensionally diffracting every sig-
nification is the same as no longer speaking of anything but the 
sense that makes me, and it is certainly here that Heidegger—who 
was less interested in giving a new meaning to Thales’s “know 
thyself” than in revisiting the thinking of Being—was unable to 
accept the consequences of his questioning, unless in the later 
form of a tautological thinking seeking to say something without 
speaking about something. So this new questioning that I have in 
mind radically interrogates the attitude of the philosophizing indi-
vidual himself. It is the multi­dimensional diffraction of significa-
tions that prevents the philosophizing individual from continuing 
to reduce significations to identities of ob­jects of the mind, and 
therefore from continuing to unknowingly absolutize himself as 
someone not-constituted by the sense “present-at-hand,” and so 
as originary or a “subjectum”: the multi­dimensional diffraction of 
significations would allow the philosophizing individual to adopt 
a completely anti-natural attitude which would not contradict the 
thesis of this philosophizing individual on the finitude of Dasein as 
constituted by being-in-the-world.
69Now, while it is not possible here to effect the multi­dimensional 
diffraction of significations so as to elaborate the new radically 
non­objectivizing problematic, it is at least possible to indicate 
how this internal overturning of Heideggerian questioning brings 
about an all­encompassing relativization—which is also to say a 
validation—of Simondon’s genetic ontology, where the only error 
was to think of it as “first philosophy.”43 The difference between 
multi­dimensional sense and the object of knowledge which is 
certainly a dimension of sense—but only one dimension—trans-
lates (internally, this time, to this sole dimension of sense that 
is the object of knowledge) into the difference between individ-
ual and substance. Now, it is precisely the difference between 
individual and substance that is foundational for Simondon’s 
genetic ontology: knowledge of individuation is knowledge of 
beings as relations and not substances. If this knowledge is 
also individuation of knowledge, and genetic ontology claims to 
be first philosophy and not a secondary translation, however 
appropriate, of another problematic, then Simondon certainly 
needs the knowledge of individuation to be a non­objectivizing 
knowledge. But it is contradictory to claim a knowledge that is 
at the same time non­objectivizing, and Simondon in fact con-
tinues to objectivize significations, manipulating them to make 
them equal to what he is speaking about, instead of thinking of 
sense as individuating itself in him. And another contradiction 
goes hand in hand with this one: Simondon attributes to the 
knowledge of individuation the privilege of being individuation 
of knowledge, but he at the same time affirms that all knowledge 
43 For an account of the difficulties Simondon encounters here, as well as 
the resolution of these difficulties brought by the “all­encompassing rel-
ativization” of his ontology within a System of Philosophical Relativity now 
opened by a “philosophical semantic” (one in which the philosophizing 
individual only claims to think the sense by which he is produced), see the 
last chapter of my book Penser la connaissance et la technique après Simondon 
(Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005). The program of Philosophical Relativity is also 
expounded, more pedagogically, in my article “Penser après Simondon et 
par­delà Deleuze,” in Cahiers Simondon No. 2, ed. Jean-Hugues Barthélémy 
(Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010).
70 is individuation of knowledge and that the theory of knowledge 
must not precede ontogenesis.44 These contradictions reveal that 
knowledge of individuation remains a knowledge and can only 
claim to be non­objectivizing because it appropriately translates, 
in the sole ontological dimension, the radically non­objectivizing 
attitude which the philosophizing individual must adopt in the 
first problematic—a first problematic which should multi­dimen-
sionally diffract every signification, only then to translate itself in 
each of the dimensions of sense thus released, and rediscover, 
in one of these uni-dimensional translations, Simondon’s genetic 
ontology and the truth of his non-anthropology.
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